The study is a contribution to the theoretical/empirical analysis of the problem of outsourcing of policy advice in the public administration. It provides the typologies of expenses for policy advice in the public administration and examines the relationship between internal and external expenses on an example of the ministries of the Czech Republic for the period from 2001 to 2011. It shows that extreme changes in the form of increases in expenses for outsourcing arise when an amendment to the Act on Public Contracts is prepared. We explain the problem on the basis of changes in the behaviour of the clients as a result of expected changes to the contracting conditions. The study shows that several factors infl uence the amount of expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice. The "large" ministries have relatively fewer expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice than "small" ministries. Ministries that have their own workplaces available in their structures (i.e. in the form of their own scientifi c research workplaces) have lower than average expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice. Ministries with higher average wages are ministries with a relatively large number of managers in relation to the number of analysts, and thus they implement a higher degree of external services (measured as a share of the wage expenses).
Introduction
The provisioning of advice to policy makers is an age-old topic of scholarly debate. Yet, until recently, policy advice has been studied more from the philosophical and normative positions rather than from the analytical and empirical perspective. This has changed during the last two decades when quite a few scholars have tried to analyse how policy advice for politicians is actually organised, who provides such advice and with what results (e.g. Halligan, 1995; Howlett, 2009a Howlett, , 2009b Wellstead, Stedman and Howlett, 2011; Howlett and Walker, 2012) . The new "empirically-driven" scholarship on policy advisory systems (hereinafter "PAS") has led to many interesting, though not always consistent, fi ndings (see also Halligan, 1995 and Howlett, 2011) . The role of outsourcing and consultants in time of the public sector reform is addressed in Raudla (2013) . Her paper focuses on "the problems that can emerge when policy and management advice for preparing a major public sector reform is purchased from a series of private sector actors".
The approaches of the aforementioned authors can be used to defi ne the types of PAS and their expenses in the conditions of the Czech Republic (see Table 1 ). First, there are central (or regional) public administration organisations such as ministries (and their units and departments) as well as other state institutions which are directly accountable to elected politicians. Policy advice in these institutions is generated by civil servants as a part of civil service. It can be assumed that decision-makers can require advice from people in these institutions directly and can legitimately expect to get it promptly. Hereinafter, we will call this locus of policy advice "direct internal PAS". We will designate these services as "type A internal expenses".
Second, there are state or public institutions which work at arm's length from the central (regional) government. They include various institutions of applied research, organisations gathering and analysing data and other agencies of various types. These institutions are semi-autonomous in that they are not directly governed by elected politicians. Instead politicians can infl uence the work of these institutions indirectly, especially by allocating funding or by selecting the directors of these organisations. However, the day-to-day work of these institutions is relatively autonomous. They are, for instance, relatively free in choosing research topics or partners and are usually not expected to provide immediate advice "on the spot". Yet, they are still part of the public sector. They are supposed to help public administration and the government as a part of their mission, and this help includes providing policy advice, usually without any further compensation. Therefore, hereinafter we will refer to these institutions as "distant internal PAS". We will designate these services with the term "type B internal expenses".
Third, there are institutions outside the public sector which provide policy advice either voluntarily or on a contractual basis. They include both profi t and non-profi t organisations outside the government. The mission, funding, scope and quality of these institutions are very heterogeneous. What makes them similar is the fact that they are not part of the public sector and cannot be directly compelled to provide policy advice if they do not wish to. For the sake of simplicity, we will hereinafter call them "external PAS". We will use the term "external expenses for the given service" 1 to designate these expenses. The externalization of the PAS can mean different things and can be studied from different perspectives (Veselý, 2013; Tiernan, 2011; Howlett, 2013) . One group of authors (e.g. Howlett, 2009a Howlett, , 2009b Howlett and Migone, 2013) focuses on the "sociology of policy analysis". A second group of authors (the "institutional stream") focuses upon different institutional arrangements and institutional structures (e.g. Halligan, 1995; Saint-Martin, 1998a , 1998b Fleischer, 2009) . Third, "the qualitative stream" includes qualitative interviews, focus groups, Q-methodology and related techniques (e.g. Colebatch, 2006; Colebatch, Hoppe and Noordegraaf, 2011) .
Another group of authors (the "expenditure stream") focuses mostly upon government expenditures for external consultants (Perl and White, 2002; National Audit Offi ce, 2010) or the share of government contracts (local, provincial and federal) in the overall revenues of consulting fi rms (Saint-Martin, 1998a; Nemec et al., 2005) . In-depth analyses of expenditures on policy advising and consultation have been carried out in several countries, such as the UK (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007 Accounts, , 2010 National Audit Offi ce, 2006) and New Zealand (Scott, Duignan and Faulkner, 2010) . These studies were often initiated because of the perceived ineffi ciency of the use of public funds on advising and consulting activities and the growth of expenditures on them.
It is also possible to classify the work that concerns the analysis of transaction expenses (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) , contracting (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) , the quality of contracted services (Nemec et al., 2008a) and the transparency of the contracting procedures (Pavel and Sičáková Beblavá, 2008) into this "expenditure stream". The initial idea of economic analyses of expenses for the external provisioning of policy advice is "outsourcing".
The outsourcing of policy advice is understood to mean such a method for its acquisition, where this advice is prepared and provided by organisations that stand outside of the public sector or outside the organisational structures of the given public administration institution for which the given organisation provides the consultation. The quality of such a contract is infl uenced by several factors (Nemec et al., 2008b) , particularly the transparency of the market (Pavel and Sičáková Beblavá, 2008) , the type of contract (Prager, 1994) , how open competition is (Maaytová, 2012) and the competitive environment (Pavel, 2010) 2 . The resolution of the question whether to outsource the given service or insource it has the form of an institutional dilemma, as shown by Beblavý and Sičáková Beblavá (2006) . 1 Surely, the PAS landscape is much more complicated and a more sophisticated PAS typology could be created. Yet the classifi cation outlined above has its advantage, we believe, in its simplicity and its relative agreement with empirical and theoretical research realized so far. The distinction between internal and external PAS is crucial because most PAS literature has focused upon the relation between the two. Most importantly, many authors have argued that the importance of external PAS, as measured, for instance, by government expenditures on external PAS, is steadily growing. For the sake of simplicity, we will hereinafter refer to this proposition as the "externalization thesis".
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For excellent review on contracting out policy advice see Boston (1994) .
In theory we can fi nd three hypotheses to explain the origin of outsourcing (Perl and White, 2002) . First, externalization may be caused by structural changes in the public sector, and especially the downsizing of its workforce. Simply put, PA is increasingly subcontracted because of decreasing internal PAS. Perl and White (2002) indeed found that the number of operational and administrative support workers explains 93.3 per cent of variance in policy consulting expenditures in Canada. Given the popularity of New Public Management (NPM) ideas in the Czech Republic and in the Slovak Republic (Nemec et al., 2008a (Nemec et al., , 2008b , we may assume that this hypothesis is highly relevant, too.
Second, growth can be caused by greater demands in knowledge intensive sectors such as health, transport and environment. Perl and White (2002) call this the "knowledge expansion" hypothesis. They argue that more external advice is needed because many policy issues have increasingly technical characteristics and civil servants are not able to keep up with this; outsourcing has expanded in departments of environment and health, while it has been less evident in transport. While the "knowledge expansion" hypothesis seems legitimate, it is not completely clear which policy domains should be expected to be more knowledge intensive than others and why.
The third possible explanation offered by Perl and White (2002) lies in the politicisation of the public administration. The authors argue that the subcontracting of advice makes it easier for the government to get analyses more favourable to its preferences. Though this is a very interesting hypothesis we do not have any reliable indicator of politicisation and thus cannot test it 3 . There are, of course, other factors that can infl uence the dynamics of external expenses for policy advice. These include the way the public contract system is set up, the given institution's degree of internal capacities, the total economic development or nature and width of the given institution's agenda.
5. Is it possible to confi rm that the larger (smaller) the number of employees at the ministry, the lower (greater) its expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice? Do larger ministries have greater facilities to provide policy advice?
The following text contains the answers to the aforementioned questions. To our knowledge there has not yet been a similar analysis published. Our present results can thus spur next research and problem solving in this area.
Data for Empirical Analysis
The key dependent variable in our research, namely the level of externalization, is expressed as the expenditures of fourteen ministries on consulting and advisory services. We used data from two national publicly available registers, ARIS and ÚFIS. These registers contain data on public expenditures classifi ed according to Ministry of Finance Decree No. 323/2002, on the Budget Structure. The expenditures and revenues are classifi ed according to several classifi cation schemes, including ministerial "chapters" (e.g. the Ministry of Finance) and the type of expenditures/revenues. Under the later classifi cation, there is item 5166 entitled "Consulting, advisory and legal services". They are defi ned as: "Expenditures for the contractual acquisition of information which does not have the status of property…" This information includes consulting, advice, analyses, reports, legal services or other information that the organisation uses for decision-making and is not explicitly legally bound to deliver (the provisioning of information which the organisation is obliged to provide by specifi c legal norms is classifi ed under item 5169) 4 . These expenditures (see Table 1 ) are external expenses for the acquisition of contracted advisory and consulting services.
As for the time period, we have been limited by the availability of ARIS and ÚFIS data. These datasets cover the period from 2001 to 2011, providing us with only an eleven-year time series. The covered period, however, is very interesting. It includes both right-wing and left-wing governments; periods of economic boom, economic recession and the global economic crisis in 2008, followed by immense cuts in public budgets. Also worth mentioning is the EU accession in 2004 as well as changes to the regulatory rules in public contracts (the amendment to the Act on Public Contracts), which directly infl uences the outsourcing of advisory and consulting services.
On the other hand, a major public administration reform (the establishment of autonomous regions and transfer of authority) was realized prior to this period (in 2000) . Our data is thus not affected by the crucial changes in the structure of public budgets and the devolution of competencies (and sometimes also staff) to the regions. 4 This defi nition seems to capture external PAS and advisory services rather nicely. The reference to decision-making makes this indicator clearly related to "policy work", and the exclusion of activities which the organisation is obliged to do (such as data gathering for statistical purposes) eliminates routine work (such as hiring a company to provide the organisation with information systems). Though retrieving data from the registers was rather cumbersome, cross-checking evidence (such as other registers and our interviews with civil servants) indicates that the data is reliable and both internally and externally valid. It must be noted that we are able to discern only external expenditures for both ministries and state organisational units (SOUs) together (see defi nitions above).
It was more complicated to measure the extent of direct internal PASs. Pending the large-scale survey, we do not have data on the number of policy workers or policy analysts in the ministries (after all, such a job title in the Czech Republic does not exist) 5 . The state's fi nal accounts, however, contain information on the numbers of civil servants in ministries as well as on their salaries. We have been able to distinguish between various types of civil servants and take into account only those that work directly for ministries and not for other organisations supported or governed by ministries (i.e. not for the so-called "public research institutions" (hereinafter "PRI", in Czech "veřejné výzkumné instituce") and "state organizational units" (hereinafter "SOU", in Czech "organizační složky státu"). Truly, the number of civil servants in ministries does not equal the extent of internal PASs because many of these workers carry out routine activities and do not provide any policy advice. We are not able to discern how much of these internal expenditures were allocated to policy or analytical units (type A internal expenses). However, this number is at least a good indicator of potential for internal PAS.
The measurement of the distant internal PAS (type B internal expenses) was even more diffi cult. We proceeded as follows: fi rst, we analysed the lists of organisations established by each ministry which are available on their respective websites. Then we used the public Access to Registers of Economic Subjects/Entities (ARES) to fi nd the legal form of each organisation. Then we researched each organisation's relevance for policy advice. We included all organisations that are at least partly concerned with producing analyses, analysing data, preparing strategies and so on. If possible, we also analysed the annual reports of these organisations. Then we tried to estimate the number of employees in each organisation, either from annual reports (the preferred choice) or from ARES 6 . This can be taken only as a rough estimate of the extent of the distant internal PASs (or for the calculation of type B internal expenses).
Results of the Empirical Analysis
On the basis of analyses of contemporary theoretical responses to the issue of policy advice, we set the basic research question: what is the role of the factors that according to our view have (under Czech conditions) a considerable infl uence on the dynamics of expenditures for policy advice? We decompose this basic research question into further research questions.
Analysis of the proportion of external and internal expenditures on policy advice
The fi rst research question establishes the problem of what the proportion of external expenditures for policy advice is in the overall current costs and how this proportion changes over time. To look for the answers to this question it was necessary to acquire data on expenditures for the outsourcing of policy advice and data on the amount of the overall current costs of the state budget (Table 2) .
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The large-scale empirical research of policy workers in the Czech Republic's public administration will be realised in our project next year. 6 ARES only provides categorised information on the number of employees (e.g. "500-1,000").
In the absence of more specifi c information on the organisation, we used ARES interval midpoint values (i.e. if the interval was 500-1,000, we used 750). As the proportion of expenditures for policy advice and the total current costs (the quota of ext/CC) shows, the expenditures for the outsourcing of policy advice (item 5166) are relatively small when compared to the overall current costs of the state budget. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile examining them, since their analysis can help to uncover new trends in the outsourcing of services on the level of the central bodies of the state administration.
If we display the proportion of external expenditures on policy advice to the overall current costs in a graph (see Figure 1) , it is evident that the quota increased up to the year 2006.
Figure 1 | Proportion of External Expenses for Policy Advice in Overall Current Costs (ext/CC)
Source: data from Czech Statistical Offi ce, Table 2 
in this text, own calculations
The later development is more random and cannot be judged to be a longer-term trend or other dependency. A polynomial function of degree 2, explaining 73.4% of the variability (see Figure 1 ), appears to be a suitable to describe this relation.
It can be inferred from the results of the empirical analysis that a certain turning point occurred in 2006. This turning point is probably caused by the fact that a new version of the Act on Public Contracts was passed on 14th March 2006 and it, among other things, signifi cantly changed the limits for assigning public contracts. These were also refl ected in the area of policy advisory services. According to the version of the Act on Public Contracts from 2006 the limits for small contracts were decreased. This led to two reactions on the part of contracting authorities. They now had to announce a tender for policy advice from the limit of CZK 3 million for the expected value of the public contract. At the same time it occurred, in practice, that the contracting authority broke up a larger public contract into several smaller contracts (contrary to the law) in order to be below the limit for small contracts, thus avoiding having to announce a "classic" tender.
The interviews with contracting authorities recently performed by the authors of this study as part of another research project signalised another possible result of this amendment on the growth of quotas of external expenditures for policy advice and overall current costs. The contracting authorities stated that each change (amendment) to the Act on Public Contracts means a risk when they make decisions. New procurement conditions and objectively-lacking experience in the new and amended procurement procedures lead the contracting authorities (as mentioned in their own statements) to "stock up" (see the turning point in 2006), or "postpone" the need for public contracts to a later time when the "given amendment to the Act on Public Contracts will be suffi ciently verifi ed". Thus the contracting authorities act like rational decision-makers, who want to minimise the risks of their decisions. This hypothesis, however, would require further verifi cation. An analysis of the trends of expenditures that arise after the year 2012, when the Act on Public Contracts was amended yet again (1 April 2012), lowering the limits for small contracts, which assumes the value of the public contract to be up to CZK 1 million, could be an indicator of the rational justifi ability for any further testing of this hypothesis. The category of "advisory and consulting services" in the regime of the "classic" awarding of public contracts is also behind this threshold. Unfortunately the appropriate data are still not accessible. It can be "surmised" from Figure 1 that the amendment to the Act on Pubic Contracts (2012) will elicit a similar rational reaction on the part of the contracting authorities as the amendment in the year 2006. In 2011 there was once again an increase of the quotas of external expenditures for advisory and consulting services and overall current costs. These conclusions, however, remain hypotheses. Only a longer period of time will enable the empirical verifi cation of the validity of the aforementioned claims in the future.
External expenditures and the main factors being researchedoverview
The second research question is what the relationship is between external expenditures for advisory and consulting services and the "size of the ministry measured by overall expenditures" and "size of the ministry measured by the number of employees" factors and the "average wage" factor. The answer to this question is contained in Table 3 . The following conclusions can be deduced from the analysis of the results of the correlation analysis for the preference of externalization (measured as ext/CC, see Table 3 ):
There was no monotonous trend over time. The correlation coeffi cient is not statistically signifi cantly different from zero (coeffi cient = 0.0153 for Time). The size of the ministry, on the contrary (measured either by total expenditures or the number of employees), is a relevant factor that is statistically signifi cant and negative. Thus "large" ministries expend relatively fewer fi nances on external services than "small" ministries. This probably corresponds to the fact that "larger" ministries have a greater capacity of their own to realise consultation and advisory services in their own organisational structures. "Smaller" ministries, on the contrary, do not have such a capacity of their own to perform consultation and advisory services, and therefore outsource the necessary services.
It was not possible to prove the infl uence of macroeconomic variables in the form of real changes of the GDP. Thus it seems that the use of external services is not dependent on the phases of the economic cycle, which the conclusion performed for the "Time" variable confi rms. This can probably be explained by the fact that the rules (legal regulations) for the implementation of outsourcing are set relatively strictly and independent of GDP growth.
On the other hand the conjecture was confi rmed that those ministries that have their "own scientifi c research workplaces" (implementing type B internal expenses) in their structures or subordinate to them do not need to outsource the required consulting and advisory services. Thus those ministries (namely the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Agriculture) implement a relatively below average volume of external services. The coeffi cient for "d2_own" (see Table 3 ) is negative and statistically signifi cant. Thus the aforementioned ministries implement below average quotas of external services, as we show in more detail in the Table 4 .
The average wage at ministries and the level of outsourcing do not correlate (the coeffi cient = 0.0425 for average wage) on this level of the analysis. On the other hand, it is an interesting fi nding (see Table 5 ) that the ministries with higher wages realise a greater degree of external services measured by the ratio to one employee (the coeffi cient = 0.24 for ext/L, see the Appendix). One of the possible explanations is that the ministries with a higher wages have a relatively higher proportion of higher managerial functions (with relatively higher salaries) and fewer "regular" analysts (with relatively low salaries) than at ministries with a lower ratio of wage expenses per capita (employees). In other words, when the wages are higher, which is caused by a higher share of highly qualifi ed professionals, this situation leads to a higher degree of external expenses (outsourcing) per employee. Thus services of more of a "non-managerial character" are procured externally. We are led to this claim (hypothesis) by personal work experience from the practice of the state administration in the Czech Republic. It is necessary, however, to research this hypothesis independently with the support of the corresponding empirical research. So far the currently available data does not enable such an analysis.
External expenditures to policy advice and expenditures for employee wages
The third research question is what the relationship is between external expenditures for policy advisory services and expenses for employee wages. Figure 2 gives a more detailed view of the given problem.
Figure 2 | Ratio of External Expenditures on the Overall Wage Expenditures

Source: data from Czech Statistical Offi ce, own calculations
No clear trend can be deduced from Figure 2 , though we can discern two peaks in the ratio of external expenditures for policy advisory services to overall wage expenditures (the years 2002 and 2006). In the aforementioned years the Act on Public Contracts was amended or amendments to the Act on Public Contracts were prepared for adoption. It can be assumed that the prepared amendment to the Act on Public Contracts are probably a factor that qualifi es (in the aforementioned sense) the rational behaviour of the contracting authorities of public contracts in order to minimise the risk from unknown new contracting procedures (established by the amendment) in the form of "stocking up" on outsourcing services. In some cases it can also mean that the contracting authority is "informatively mapping new terrain" of public contracting and having an expert study prepared describing the expected "state of the amendment" before the amendment comes into effect.
Outsourcing and the ministries' own facilities for the performance of policy advisory services
The fourth research question asks whether a tendency for external expenditures for policy advisory services to increase is lower at those ministries which have research workplaces, colleges and universities in their structures (see next table for details). If this is the case, then it probably confi rms the greater facilities of the given research and university institutions to perform, in favour of the governing ministries, the necessary policy advisory services that would otherwise be outsourced. Table 4 shows the results of the analyses. Table 4 designated by "*" are those with various institutions that are subordinate to them and that can perform policy advisory services to their benefi t. An empirical analysis of the available data shows that these ministries really do tend to have a lower ratio of external expenditures to wage expenditures. This ratio is significantly under the (unweighted arithmetic) average of all the ministries. It is not possible, however, to deduce clear conclusions about the suitability of the insourcing of the given services compared to its outsourcing from this fi nding (without the support of profound audit). During an analysis of the expenses of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, a signifi cantly high variation coeffi cient (101%) was found, which indicates a signifi cant ambivalence of values, seemingly in connection with the "intermittence" of the sector's needs.
Ministries in
Outsourcing and size of ministries
The fi fth research question is whether it is valid that the larger (smaller) the number of employees at a ministry, the lower (greater) the expenditures on the outsourcing of policy advisory services. In other words, do larger ministries have greater facilities to perform policy advisory services? Table 4 contains the input data for the performance of the analysis.
On the basis of the analysis it is possible to state a slight positive dependence between the number of employees and the costs for outsourcing. Pearson's correlation coeffi cient is 0.39 but not statistically signifi cant on the common levels of signifi cance.
If we analyse the relationship of expenditures for the external provisioning of policy advice to the number of employees on the level of the individual ministries, the results of the research are as follows (Table 5) . Pearson's correlation coeffi cient between (A) and (B) -0.24
Note: The relationship of relative external expenditures and the sizes of the ministries is measured during the entire monitored period and on the level of the individual ministries.
The variable "Size" acquires three values according to the relationship of the ave-rage number of employees of the given ministry to the average state for all ministries. "Medium" indicates that the deviation from the average is not more than 30%. Size is defi ned for the purpose of the graphical representation below (Figure 3 ).
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce, own calculations.
It follows from the analysis that the larger ministries (measured by the number of employees) have, on average for the entire period, a lower quota of external expenditures (see the negative correlation coeffi cient, -0.24). This could, for example, mean that ministries with a greater number of personnel have a greater capacity for the performance of policy advisory services, which they carry out as part of the performance of the specifi ed analytical and conceptual activities.
If we use a different perspective, specifi cally by dividing the ministries into groups according to size and monitoring the behaviour of the quotas for the individual years, then we fi nd that the larger ministries have nominally larger external expenditures but relatively lower ones. Figure 3 displays this problem. Table 5 for subject´s abbreviations.
The given conclusion is not surprising. In general larger ministries have more extensive ("voluminous") spheres of operation with the related ("more voluminous") performance of administrative activities. Thus it is possible to expect that in order to perform these activities the ministries will need a correspondingly greater nominal "volume" of analytical services that they will either produce through their own capacities or by purchases in the private sector.
If the demanded policy advice is so specifi c that the given ministry does not have its own capacity to produce such services, then no objections can be raised to their outsourcing. That, however, would require the performance of a "documentation audit," which is an analysis of the individual contracts and agreements about the outsourcing and to compare whether the given ministry really does not have the capacity available for the given policy advisory services. It would also be good to have a performance audit accompany this audit. Such information, however, is not currently available and acquiring it through research is unattainable under the current conditions. If we focus on quotas (see Figure 3 ) from the analysed size groups the development of the quotas of external expenditures for policy advisory services to the number of employees at the Ministry of Transport (MT, small A group) is intriguing. This ministry can demonstrate certain general problems related to the outsourcing of policy advisory services in the Czech Republic. In the case of the Ministry of Transport, it is possible to "relatively rationally" expect a rather high need for consultation, expert opinions, assessments, etc. related to complicated construction projects 7 . This observation results from interviews with relevant ministries. In the future these contrary results for MT and MRD will be explicitly tested.
When monitoring the trends of the given quotas, the signifi cant growth in the year 2006 sticks out. This is probably connected with the aforementioned lowering of the limit on small contracts and the aforementioned change in the behaviour of contracting authorities under the conditions of the changing rules in the form of the amendment to the Act on Public Contracts.
The total results of the correlation between the external expenditures for policy advisory services and the current costs, the number of employees and employee wages are given in Table 6 .
At fi rst glance at the results of the analysis, it is interesting that the correlation coeffi cient (see bold numbers) between the external expenditures and the number of employees at the Ministry of Transport is highly positive while being highly negative at the Ministry for Regional Development, even though both ministries belong to the same size group (small). What is the reason for this? Possible explanations are as follows: First is the fact that the Ministry of Transport primarily implements expansive construction projects with relatively expected specialised (external) advisory and consultation support for which the ministry (altogether objectively) does not have its own specialists. On the other hand, the Ministry for Regional Development has large capital expenditures (over the last three years the capital expenditures make up more than about 80% of all the expenditures in its budget each year). These capital expenditures are covered to a considerable extent from EU funds. Since the rules for handling these fi nances are given by EU regulations, it is not necessary (or even practical) to demand additional expenses for policy advisory services in order to realise these expenditure activities. Plus another factor plays a role here, specifi cally the fact that in the case of the Ministry for Regional Development most of the products of external policy advisory services have the character of legal consultations, while in the case of the Ministry of Transport they are project activities, the assessment of construction projects, expert opinions whose contents are bound to particular complicated (and therefore expensive) professional consultations and output with the corresponding high external acquisition expenditures for consulting and advisory services. Note: L is number of employees. "Ext" and "wages" were defi ned above.
Policy implication and recommendations emerged from analysis
Based on our analysis it was possible to make the following conclusions: Generally speaking, ministries in the Czech Republic differ in the way how they spend fi nances for policy advice outsourcing. These differences are caused by a range of factors which determine the size to be outsourced. Basically, the factors can be divided into two groups. First, there are primarily hard factors which comprise budget and budget rules for instance. If the ministries have suffi cient fi nancial resources to outsource the policy advice then they try to spend them entirely. This situation is caused by the bid budget system used in Czech Republic. In our opinion, it is necessary to change the existing system into performance budgeting. Additionally, here has not been any monitoring system which would enable expense audit on a value for money basis. Second, the expenses for policy advice outsourcing are infl uenced by soft factors as well. For instance, ministries also differ in the use of internal and external capabilities. Typically, some of the policy advice has been outsourced despite the fact that the ministries have had enough own capabilities to provide the service. Further, it was observed that there have been attempts made to transfer a part or the entire accountability for the policy onto third parties. At other times the policy is passed (outsourced) to companies belonging to ministry executives' acquaintances. It is evident the policy advice outsourcing in the Czech Republic is dependent on a variety of factors. A comprehensive audit of ministries can reveal the particular cause. As of April 2014 the government of Czech Republic has currently initiated such audits. Our results have unravelled certain issues which will be discussed at the Policy Advice Outsourcing Review with each ministry.
Conclusion
An analysis of the theoretical work shows that the problem of outsourcing policy advice in existing research was examined predominantly in isolated instances or only from a single perspective. The study attempts to apply a holistic approach during the examination of the outsourcing of policy advice and it indicates how it is possible to examine the given problem from the position of an interdisciplinary approach on the basis of the defi nition of organisational, structural, personnel and economic factors infl uencing outsourcing expenditures.
Even though the expenditures for outsourcing policy advice does not represent a signifi cant part of the budgeted expenses of the relevant ("ministerial") sections of the state budget, their further examination has both theoretical and practical importance. Policy advice represents a relatively "sophisticated" product, which is the result of creative and highly-specialised activities of highly-qualifi ed professionals. Modern trends in public administration show that the public administration will place continually increasing demands on high specialisation and qualifi cations necessary for the production of the services. This can potentially lead to the further "denationalisation" of the public administration and its "privatisation". If this truly is the case, then examining expenditures for policy advisory services represents a certain "laboratory" in which the modernisation of trends in public administration can be monitored and verifi ed, making the appropriate theoretical and practical conclusions for the area of the theory of the public administration and for practical reforms.
It can be seen that extreme changes in the form of increases of expenditures for outsourcing appear when changes to the regulations (the Act on Public Contracts) are prepared and announced. Contracting authorities from the level of the state administration probably included the expected change to the limit for the amount of the estimated value of the public contract and the change to regulations in their decisions for outsourcing policy advisory services. They probably also order and implement "superfl uous" services. By doing so they "stock up," fi guratively speaking, because they do not know how the procedural rules for contracting these services will change. At the same time they probably do so in order to minimise the risk ensuing from not knowing the new facts ensuing from the amendment to the Act on Public Contracts.
Several factors have a demonstrable infl uence on the relative quota of the expenditures covering the outsourcing of policy advisory services. The amount of the expenditures for outsourcing is infl uenced by the size of the ministries measured by the number of employees. The division of the ministries into size groups (small, medium, large) and expenditures for the outsourcing of policy advice show a negative correlation. This fi nding is rationally explainable. Large ministries have a larger capacity of their own to perform the services in their own structures. It must be mentioned, however, that this conclusion tells nothing about the quality of the services produced. In addition to this it would be necessary to perform a performance audit at the individual ministries, which the ministries practically never performed as of now (even though they are required to do so by Act No. 320/2001 Coll., on Financial Control in the Public Administration).
The analysis shows that those ministries that have subsidiary workplaces (e.g. in the form of their own scientifi c research workplaces) in their structures realise below average expenses for the outsourcing of policy advisory services. It is not possible, however, to make clear conclusions from the aforementioned fi ndings with regard to the limitation of outsourcing of policy advice on the one hand and their provisioning by insourcing on the basis of organisational changes on the other. This is because information is not available on the quality of the service, which would, on the basis of a comparison of the same type of consulting and advisory services acquired through its own production and outsourcing of the same service, make it possible to make a cost benefi t analysis with the subsequent corresponding recommendations.
In conclusion it is necessary also to mention the probable new factor of the "optical" decrease in expenditures for consulting and advisory services (item 5166) in the year 2012, as shown by the partial analysis of these expenditures for the year 2012 (Táborský, 2013) . This is probably because the ministries are rationally reacting bureaucratically to the approved "Resolution No. 146 
by the Government of the Czech Republic from 7 March 2012 on the Limit of the Organisation Units of the State From Drawing on
Unused Expenditures in the Year 2012". The resolution states that if a ministry or other administrative authority concludes a contract for the delivery of consulting, advisory or legal services for more than CZK 1 million from one supplier during a calendar year, the proposal for the conclusion of such a contract is subject to the government's approval (see Point 2 of the aforementioned government resolution). This brings additional administrative expenses to the ministries. When the aforementioned government resolution comes into effect, starting in the year 2012, the ministries will probably react rationally to this fact by moving part of the expenditures for consulting and advisory services (item 5166) to a different item (5169), which is designated as "purchases of other services". It will only be possible to verify if this assumption is justifi ed, however, when the necessary complex statistical data for the year 2012 are available. Note: Correlation Coeffi cients, using 154 observations (14n*11t), 5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.1582 for n = 154. CC are current costs in CZK, L is number of employees, LC is labour costs, ext/CC, ext/L are relative quotas of EXT to current costs and number of employees respectively, Avgwage is average monthly wage, d1_2006 is Dummy variable equal to 1 for the period of the years from 2006 to 2011, inclusive, otherwise 0, d2_own is binomial variable equal to 1 for ministries with "own" academic workplaces.
